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1. Introduction
Auctions are a transparent and fair method of public procurement, and are commonly
employed in the public sector. Corner-cutting is a critical issue to consider in construc-
tion contracts. In this context, corner-cutting refers to the construction of low-quality
buildings to save costs and/or time. Corner-cutting may have serious consequences in
construction, including even the high death toll1. However, most of the literature on auc-
tion do not take it into account. This article aims to explicitly introduce corner-cutting
into procurement auctions, theoretically investigate its effect, and examine the theoretical
predictions through experiments.
In our model, the firms chosen by auction as contractors have the option to cut corners
in construction. The more the contracting firms cut corners, that is, the more they save
construction cost, the lower the qualities of the constructed buildings, which result in
the higher probability that corner-cuttings are detected. If corner-cutting is detected,
a contracting firm is required to pay a penalty in accordance with the scale of corner-
cutting. However, the penalty payment is limited by the firm’s initial cash balance owing
to bankruptcy. Thus, the profit maximizing level of corner-cutting depends on the cost
of constructing buildings of the specified quality, penalty rates, initial cash balances, and
contract prices (winners’ bids).
We assume that there are at least two firms whose initial cash balances are zero. In
this paper, we focus on problems that will occur when the auction authorities of public
sectors do not limit participant qualification and auctions are opened to any firms. The
cash balances of firms on the brink of bankruptcy are virtually zero. If several such
firms participate in the auctions, the above assumption holds. During recessions, many
construction firms become bankrupt. Thus, if auctions in public sectors are made open to
any firms during that time, then the above assumption becomes reasonable. Even in non-
recessionary periods, statistically some construction firms go bankrupt. If the auctions
are open to any firms, the firms on the brink of bankruptcy would be more eager to
participate in the auctions, and the assumption would be plausible.
We find that if the above assumption holds, then in equilibria, zero-initial cash balance
firms win auctions by bidding zero amount, and construct buildings of zero quality. Our
experimental results support this theoretical result, and indicate that the firms with zero
initial cash balance win and that the winning bids and the quality of the constructed
buildings are considerably low.
There are many special rules in public construction auctions to prevent corner-cutting,
most of which are ignored in auction theory. For example, many public procurement au-
thorities in Japan and European countries such as Belgium, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and
Greece set a minimum price to exclude or detect abnormally low tenders. Alternatively,
only designated bidders–as deemed qualified on the basis of factors such as locality, tech-
nological ability, and initial cash balance–are invited to procurement auctions. Although
such special rules curb competition in auctions and are often criticized for affecting the
transparency and fairness of auction, our results suggest the necessity of these special
rules in public procurement auctions.
1For example, the New York Times (September 4, 2008, China Admits Building Flaws in Quake)
reported the following: “Chinese government committee said on Thursday that a rush to build schools
during the country’s recent economic boom might have led to shoddy construction that resulted in the
deaths of thousands of students during a devastating earthquake in May. It is well known that construction
firms and other companies often cut corners in China’s rapidly growing economy.”
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Calveras et al. (2004) show that when cost is common but uncertain for firms, firms
with a small amount of initial cash can make a profit by bidding low and declaring
bankruptcy if the cost is found to be high in the second-price auction. By conducting
experiments, Cox et al. (1996) discover that too-low bids in the first-price auction under
post-auction cost uncertainty lead to cost overruns. These articles also suggest the ne-
cessity of the above special rules in public procurement auctions. However, to the best of
our knowledge, our article is the first to introduce corner-cutting into an auction model
and to analyze its effect.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical
model. Section 3 analyzes the equilibrium. Section 4 details the experimental procedures.
Section 5 analyzes the results, and section 6 summarizes the conclusions.
2. Model Description and Notations
There are n construction firms, from which a public sector chooses a contractor for
construction. Each firm i has an initial cash balance wi. Each firm i also has a “proper
cost” di. This means that the firm needs to spend di to construct a building of the quality
specified by the public sector. Firms’ initial cash balances and proper costs represent
their financial conditions and technological competence, respectively.
The public sector employs the first price auction in choosing a contractor. Each firm
i submits its bid bi to the procurement authority of the public sector. The firm with the
minimum bid wins and is awarded the contract. Ties are broken with equal probability.
The contract price is the winner’s bid.
The firm chosen as a contractor, say firm i, does not necessarily spend its proper cost
on construction. Instead, the contractor might “cut corners” and spend a smaller amount.
Denote by ci the actual cost firm i spends on construction. We assume that the scale
of corner-cutting is represented by di − ci, and the quality of the constructed building is
determined by qi = ci/di. For example, suppose that di = 100, but firm i spends only
ci = 80 for construction. Then, the scale of corner-cutting is 20, and the quality is 0.8.
After the contractor constructs a building, the procurement authority investigates the
quality of the building. The lower the quality of the constructed building, the higher the
probability of the authority detecting corner-cutting. If qi = 1, that is, if the contractor
does not cut corners, then the probability of detection is zero. Conversely, if qi = 0,
that is, if the contractor does not spend cost for construction at all, the probability of
detection is one. For simplicity, we assume that the probability that the authority detects
corner-cutting is 1− qi = (di − ci)/di.
If the authority detects corner-cutting, it imposes a penalty on the contractor. The
greater the scale of corner-cutting, the larger is the amount of penalty. For simplicity, we
assume that the penalty is proportional to the scale of corner-cutting, and the penalty
rate is given by r > 1. That is, if the scale of corner-cutting is di − ci, the penalty is
r · (di − ci).
If the contractor who has cut corners and has been detected has enough cash balance
to pay the penalty–that is, if penalty r · (di− ci) is less than or equal to the contractor’s
cash balance, wi + bi − ci, at that point of time–then he pays the penalty. Otherwise,
the contractor goes bankrupt and pays only the cash balance wi + bi − ci.
The contract procedure in the public sectors can be summarized as follows.
Stage 1 (Auction Stage): Each firm submits bid bi to the authority. The firm with the
minimum bid wins and is chosen as the contractor. The contract price is the winning bid.
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Stage 2 (Construction Stage): The contractor determined in Stage 1, say firm i, re-
ceives the contract price bi and chooses spending ci for construction.
Stage 3 (Investigation Stage): The procurement authority investigates if the contractor
cuts corners in construction. The probability of corner-cutting being detected is (di −
ci)/di.
Stage 4 (Penalty Stage): If corner-cutting di − ci is detected in stage 3, a penalty
r · (di− ci) is imposed on the contractor. If wi+ bi− ci ≥ r · (di− ci), the contractor pays
r · (di − ci). Otherwise, he goes bankrupt and only pays wi + bi − ci.
The profit of a firm is defined as its final cash balance minus its initial cash balance.
It is computed as follows: Suppose firm i bids bi. (i) If firm i does not win the auction,
then its final cash balance is equal to its initial cash balance, and its profit is zero. (ii)
If firm i wins the auction, spends ci on construction, and corner-cutting is not detected,
then its final cash balance is wi+ bi− ci, and its profit is bi− ci. (iii) If firm i wins, spends
ci on construction, and corner-cutting is detected but it does not go bankrupt, then the
final cash balance is wi + bi − ci − r · (di − ci), and the profit is bi − ci − r · (di − ci).
(iv) If firm i wins, spends ci on construction, and corner-cutting is detected and it goes
bankrupt, then the final cash balance is 0 and its profit is −wi.
3. Theoretical Analysis
We analyze firms’ behavior backward. In other words, we first analyze their behavior
in Stage 2 and then in Stage 1.
3.1. Contractor’s choice of spending
Firms enter Stage 2 only if they win the auction in Stage 1. Thus, the firms in Stage 2
are already contractors. We analyze how much a contractor spends for construction given
its initial cash balance wi and contract price bi. In this subsection, since we focus on the
behavior of one contracting firm and ignore the others, we omit appending subscripts to
wi, di, bi, and ci for simpler notation.
When corner-cutting is detected, and the deficit is greater than the limit, i.e., c+ r ·
(d − c) − b > w, the contractor becomes bankrupt. Thus, if corner-cutting is detected,
the constructor’s payoff is max{b− c− r · (d− c),−w}.
When the contractor spends the cost c, since the probability of the detection is 1−d/c,
his expected payoff is
π = c
d
· (b− c) + d− c
d
·max{b− c− r · (d− c),−w}.
We assume that the firms are risk-neutral and seek to maximize the expected profit π as
defined above. Note that
b− c− r · (d− c) ≶ −w⇔ c ≶ [r · d− (b+ w)]/(r − 1).
Thus, a contractor goes bankrupt when corner-cutting is detected, if and only if its spend-
ing c is less than c ≡ [r · d− (b+ w)]/(r − 1).
Given w, d, and b, let c∗(w, d, b) be the optimal spending for w and b, i.e., the spending
that maximizes the expected profit, and let Π(w, d, b) = π(c∗(w, d, b)).
Proposition 1 below characterizes the optimal cost and maximal expected profit given
b and w.
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Proposition 1: Let b = 2d− w − d/
√
r. Then,
c∗(w, d, b) =
½
(b+ w)/2 if b ≤ b
(1− 1/2r) · d otherwise,
Π(w, d, b) =
½
[(b+ w)2 − 4dw] /4d if b ≤ b
b− d+ d/4r otherwise.
The proof is provided in Appendix. Proposition 1 states the following: (i) If the
contract price b is smaller than threshold level b, then the contractor’s optimal choice c∗
does not depend on its proper cost d. (ii) On the other hand, if the contract price b is
greater than b, then the contractor’s optimal choice c∗ does not depend on its initial cash
balance w or contract price b. A contractor chooses to go bankrupt when detected, if and
only if b < b.
Note that at b = b = 2d− w − d√
r
,
1
4d
· £(b+ w)2 − 4dw¤ = b− d+ d
4r
, and
b+ w
2
< (1− 1
2r
) · d.
That is, the contractor’s maximized expected profit Π(w, d, b) is continuous with respect
to b, but the optimal spending c∗(w, b) is not.
We consider a firm’s bid b0 such that if the firm wins the auction by bidding b0, his
expected profit will be zero in Stage 2. That is, b0 is a bid such that Π(w, d, b0) = 0.
We term such a bid b0 a “zero-profit bid.” If d − d/4r ≥ b, then b0 = d − d/4r, and if
d− d/4r < b, then by (b0 + w)2 − 4dw = 0, b0 = 2
√
dw − w. Note that
d− d/4r R b ⇔ w R d · ¡2√r − 1¢2 /4r.
Since Π(w, d, b) is increasing in b, Π(w, d, b) R 0⇔ b R b0. Therefore, we have Lemma 1
below.
Lemma 1: (i) If w ≥ d · (2√r − 1)2 /4r, then b0 = d − d/4r, and if w < d ·
(2
√
r − 1)2 /4r, then b0 = 2
√
d · w − w. (ii) Π(w, d, b) R 0⇔ b R b0.
In an ordinal auction model for public construction, i.e., a model in which firms have
no option of corner-cutting, once a firm wins the auction in Stage 1, it is required to spend
its proper cost in Stage 2; hence, the distinction between a firm’s proper cost and the cost
it actually spends is meaningless. In the ordinal model, the expected profit of a firm is
positive if and only if it wins the auction by bidding greater than its cost. (ii) of Lemma
1 implies that zero profit bids have similar properties in our model where firms have the
option of corner-cutting. This fact plays an important role in analyzing the equilibria of
the auction in Stage 1.
3.2. Equilibria
In this subsection, we analyze firms’ bidding behavior in Stage 1 by employing the
results of subsection 3.1. We assume that firms know only their own initial cash balances
and proper costs, but not those of the others. We analyze firms’ bidding behavior in Stage
1 in the framework of incomplete information games.
Since initial cash balances and proper costs vary, we depict firms’ bidding behaviors
as bidding functions. A bidding function of firm i is a function bi(·, ·) of its initial cash
balance wi and its proper cost di. bi(wi, bi) denotes firm i’s bid in Stage 1 when its initial
cash balance is wi and its proper cost is di.
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We denote the initial cash balance profile by w = (w1, . . . , wn), the proper cost profile
by d = (d1, . . . , dn), and the bid function profile by b(·, ·) = (b1(·, ·), . . . , bn(·, ·)). Further,
W denotes the class of initial cash balance profiles, and D the class of proper cost profiles.
For each firm i, letWi be the projection of W on the ith coordinate, Di be the projection
of D on the ith coordinate, and let W−i =
Q
j 6=iWj and D−i =
Q
j 6=iDj.
Let Pr(·) be a probability distribution onW×D. That is, Pr(W×D) = 1, and further,
for an event X ⊂W ×D, Pr(X) is the probability of the event, i.e., the probability that
(w, d) ∈ X. For firm i, given its initial cash balance wi and proper cost di, Pr−i(·;wi, di) is
the conditional probability onW−i×D−i. That is, Pr(W−i×D−i) = 1, and further, for an
event X−i ⊂W−i×D−i, Pr−i(X−i;wi, di) is the probability of the event of X−i under the
condition that firm i’s initial cash balance is wi and its proper cost is di. The conditional
expected payoff of firm i is E(bi, b−i(·, ·);wi, di) when firm i bids bi, the other firms follow
b−i(·, ·), and firm i’s initial cash balance and proper cost are wi and di, respectively.
The Bayesian Nash equilibrium defined below is a standard equilibrium concept of
incomplete information games.
Definition: A bid function profile b(·, ·) = (b1(·, ·), . . . , bn(·, ·)) is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium if for all firm i, all its cash balance wi, all its proper cost di, and all its bid bbi,
E(bi(wi, di), b−i(·, ·);wi, di) ≥ E(bbi, b−i(·, ·);wi, di)
In this paper, we pay a special attention to the event that there are at least two firms
whose initial cash balances are zero. This event is formally defined as W ∗ ×D,
where W ∗ = {w ∈W : ∃i & ∃j such that i 6= j and wi = wj = 0}.
In Proposition 2 below, we assume that the probability of this event is one, that is,
Pr(W ∗ ×D) = 1.
To state Proposition 2, we introduce a zero winning-bid profile. This is a bid function
profile b∗(·, ·) = (b∗1(·, ·), . . . , b∗n(·, ·)) such that for all firm i, all initial cash balances wi,
and all proper costs di, if wi = 0, b∗i (0, di) = 0, and if wi > 0, b
∗
i (0, di) > 0. Note that if the
above assumption holds and firms follow a zero winning-bid profile, then with probability
one, the winner is a firm with a zero initial cash balance and the winning bid is zero.
Further, note that if the winner is a firm with a zero initial cash balance and the winning
bid is zero, then it follows that in Stage 2, the winner spends nothing for construction,
and so the quality of the constructed building is zero.
Proposition 2: Assume that there are at least two firms whose initial cash balances
are zero with probability one. Then, a zero winning-bid profile is a Bayesian Nash equi-
librium. At this equilibrium, the winner is a firm with a zero initial cash balance, and the
winning bid and the quality of the building constructed by the winner are both zero.
The proof is simple. By Lemma 1, the zero-profit bids of firms with zero initial cash
balance are zero, and those of others are positive. At a zero winning-bid profile, the
conditional expected profits of all firms are zero. A firm with a zero initial cash balance
cannot win by a positive bid since another firm else bids zero. Thus, firms with zero
initial cash balance cannot obtain a greater conditional expected profit by deviating from
the zero winning-bid profile. If a firm with a positive initial cash balance bids zero,
then it wins with positive probability, but winning by zero bid makes its expected payoff
negative. Thus, firms with positive initial cash balances do not deviate either from the
zero winning-bid profile.
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It is worthwhile to remark the robustness of the equilibria of Proposition 2. Typically,
Bayesian Nash equilibria of the first price auction of Bayesian models depend on the details
of the prior probability distribution of private information. In addition, the symmetry of
the prior distribution is often assumed to derive symmetric equilibria. On the other hand,
the equilibria of Proposition 2 do not depend on such details. In this sense, the equilibria
of Proposition 2 are more robust than Bayesian Nash equilibria. This robustness is rather
similar to that of ex-post Nash equilibrium, another equilibrium concept of incomplete
information games.
Definition: A bid function profile b(·, ·) = (b1(·, ·), . . . , bn(·, ·)) is an ex-post Nash
equilibrium if for all initial cash balance profile w = (w1, . . . , wn), all proper cost profile
d = (d1, . . . , dn), for all firm i, and all its bid bbi,
ui(b(w, d);wi, di) ≥ ui(bbi, b−i(w−i, d−i);wi, di).
The concept of ex-post Nash equilibrium is independent of the probability distribu-
tion of private information such as initial cash balances and proper costs. In other words,
ex-post Nash equilibria are Bayesian Nash equilibria for any probability distribution of
private information. Similarly, although Proposition 4 requires the assumption of a prob-
ability of one for the event that there are at least two firms whose initial cash balances are
zero, the zero winning-bid profiles are the Bayesian Nash equilibria for any probability
distribution of private information that satisfy these assumptions. In the next section, we
provide experimental procedures to examine Proposition 2.
4. Experimental Procedures
The experiment was consisted of two sessions. It was programmed and conducted with
the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The subjects were undergraduate and graduate
students from Osaka University. They were invited to sign up at the designated websites
through flyers posted around campus and email solicitations sent to those students who
had signed up for other experiments before. None of the subjects participated in more
than one session.
Upon arrival, the subjects were seated at separate computer terminals, and no com-
munication was permitted throughout the session. The subjects listened to prerecorded
instructions, while simultaneously following the same from their own copies.2 In the in-
structions, they were told that their roles were those of producers producing a good each
and selling them to the experimenter3. The subjects were prohibited from asking any
questions in verifying their understanding of the procedures in an examination.
The top twenty subjects who passed the examination participated in the subsequent
proceedings4. After we announced the correct answers of the examination to the subjects,
the identification numbers of producers were determined through a lottery.
Each session consisted of 16 periods. At the beginning of each period, the subjects
are automatically assigned into five groups, each comprising four subjects5. Each subject
received his ready reckoner of the all payoffs with respect to all his bid and costs. Each
subject knew only his own initial cash balances and proper costs from that reckoner. We
2Instructions are available from the authors upon requests.
3We use "producers" instead of firms in the experiment.
4In each session, we invited more than 20 subjects including a few extra subjects in order to ensure
the necessary number.
5The instructions are available from the authors upon request.
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set initial cash balances, wi, as 0, 0, 50, and 100, and the proper cost di, as 24, 30, 36,
and 42 for each group. Throughout the 16 periods, every subject was assigned to all
combinations of 4 initial cash balances and 4 proper costs, but this fact was not informed
to the subjects. The subjects entered their proper costs and initial cash balances into their
record sheets distributed along with the instructions. Apart from their own initial cash
balances and proper costs, they are informed that each group has at least two producers
whose initial cash balances were zero in the instruction.
In each group, the first-price auction was implemented. Subjects were allowed to enter
their actual costs and bids into the interface and calculate their profits and probabilities
of corner-cutting being detected as many times as desired before they made their final
decisions. They, however, decided their costs and bids simultaneously within 6 minutes.
The subjects were not allowed to change their costs after the winner was decided. It was
mandated that their bids would be no more than the ceiling price of 58 set by us, and
that their actual costs would be no more than their proper costs. Further, the costs were
mandated to be no more than the sum of the bids and initial cash balances so as to avoid
bankruptcy before the experimenter investigated the quality of the produced good.
The penalty ratio, r, is 2. When the winner was detected to have cut corners, his final
cash balance was equal to his initial cash balance plus bid minus his cost and penalty if
he was able to pay the all amounts of penalty, and it was zero if he was not. Winner’s
profits were his final cash balance minus initial cash balance; those of others were zero.
After the winner was decided, each subject’s computer screen displayed whether or
not he won along with his own profits. The subjects enter these results into their record
sheets.
The subjects were paid in cash in accordance with their total experimental points
under the conversion rate of 7 yen (8 cents)6 for each point. To cover the loss of the
subjects, we added 40 points at the end of each period. Each session lasted roughly 3
hours. The average payments to subjects were 4,554 yen ($50.6). No one had negative
total experimental points.
5. Experimental Results
First, we focus on the market outcomes and examine Proposition 2. Table 1 summa-
rizes the means and standard errors of qualities of produced goods, winning bids, winners’
cost spending, and the ratio of the winning of producers with zero initial cash balance. On
average, the quality of produced goods is less than 0.4. the ratio of the winning of produc-
ers with zero initial cash balance is more than 0.9. These results suggest that producers
with zero initial cash balance win and cut corners in large scale. Both of the qualities
of produced goods and winning prices are not significantly different between sessions in
both t-tests (two-tailed p-values are 0.20 and 0.35, respectively) and Wilcoxon rank-sum
tests (two-tailed p-values are 0.17 and 0.52, respectively).
––––––––––––—
Table 1 is around here.
––––––––––––—
6$1 = 90 yen at that time.
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Both the qualities of produced goods and winning prices, however, are higher than the
theoretical prediction of zero. Next, we focus on the dynamics of these values and examine
whether the learnings of subjects in the laboratory induce the theoretical prediction.
Figure 1 presents all the qualities of the produced goods and the OLS regression lines
of the qualities of the produced goods for the periods in each session and for the two
sessions taken together. In each figure, circles and diamonds represent the qualities of
the goods produced by producers with zero initial cash balance and those with positive
initial cash balances, respectively. The quality of produced goods, however, are censored
variables between 0 and 1, inclusively; hence, we employ a Tobit regression of all qualities
of the produced goods on periods. Table 2 summarizes the results of this regression. The
coefficient on period is negative and significant at the 1% level in both sessions and for
the two sessions taken together. According to F-tests of the hypothesis of no changes in
the intercepts and the coefficients of periods across the two sessions, both of them are
not significantly different (two-tailed p-values are 0.212). Therefore, we conclude that the
qualities of the produced goods tend toward the theoretical prediction of zero as subjects
learn more.
––––––––––––––––-
Figure 1 and Table 2 are around here.
––––––––––––––––—
Figure 2, on the other hand, presents all the winning prices and the OLS regression
lines of the winning prices on the periods in each session and the two sessions taken
together. All winning prices are less than 30. Winning prices are also censored variables
between 0 and 58 of the ceiling price, inclusively, and hence, we employ a Tobit regression
of all winning prices on periods. Table 3 summarizes the results of this regression. The
coefficient on period is negative and significant at the 1% level in both sessions and in
both taken together. According to the F-tests of the hypothesis of no changes in the
intercepts and the coefficient of period across sessions, both sessions are not significantly
different (two-tailed p-values are 0.246). Therefore, we conclude that the winning prices
tend toward the theoretical prediction of zero as subjects learn more.
––––––––––––––––––
Figure 2 and Table 3 are around here.
––––––––––––––––––
Proposition 2 also suggests that the proper costs of producers with zero initial cash
balance do not affect both the winning prices and the qualities of the produced goods.
In order to examine this suggestion, we add the proper cost as a variable to the above
Tobit regression of winning prices and that of qualities of the produced goods and conduct
separate Tobit regressions. Table 4 summarizes the results of these regressions. Since there
are no significant differences in the winning prices and the qualities of the produced goods
between sessions as described in the F-tests above, we use pooled data across sessions in
each regression. In these regressions, the coefficients on proper cost are not significant
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in the winning prices, but are negative and significant at the 1% level in the qualities
of the produced goods. These findings suggest that the proper costs of producers with
zero initial cash balance do not affect the winning prices but affect the qualities of the
produced goods in the laboratory.
––––––––––––—
Table 4 is around here.
––––––––––––—
The average of the qualities of produced goods for the proper costs of 24, 30, 36, and
42 are 0.41, 0.37, 0.27, and 0.24, respectively. In the experiment, the subjects must choose
integer costs, so that producers with zero initial cash balance and with higher proper costs
have more choices with regard to their cost spending. Since the quality is inversely related
to proper cost, the higher the proper cost, the lesser is the quality. Our results suggest
that theoretically non-binding proper costs may affect the qualities of the produced goods.
It is similar to the results of the market experiments in Smith and Williams (1981), Isaac
and Plott (1981), Coursey and Smith (1983), and Gode and Sunder (2004), who discover
that theoretically non-binding price controls also affect trading prices.
Next, we focus on individual behaviors and examine the relation between bids and
costs as described in Proposition 1. Table 5 summarizes the results of OLS regression
of costs on bids for each proper costs in the region bi < b. Since there are only data of
producers with zero initial cash balance on this region, we set wi = 0. The coefficients on
price are more than 0.5 and significant at the 5% level for each proper cost. According
to the F-test of the hypothesis that ci = bi/2, the experimental results are significantly
different from the risk-neutral theoretical prediction for each proper cost. This result
suggests that subjects spend more than the theoretical risk-neutral level relative to the
bid if bi < b.
––––––––––––—
Table 5 is around here.
––––––––––––—
Table 6 summarizes, on the other hand, the results of the OLS regression of costs on
bids for each proper costs on the region bi ≥ b. The coefficient on price is more than
0 and significant at the 5% level for the proper costs 24 and 42. According to the F-
test of the hypothesis that ci = 3di/4, the experimental results are significantly different
from the risk-neutral theoretical prediction for each proper cost. In this region, however,
the adjusted R2 is very low. Therefore, we need more experiments to obtain a precise
conclusion with regard to whether or not the subjects are risk averse.
––––––––––––—
Table 6 is around here.
––––––––––––—
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6. Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed corner-cutting by firms who participate in procurement
auctions. Theoretically, in the first-price auction, if there are at least two firms with zero
initial cash balance, the winning bids and the qualities of the constructed buildings in the
Bayesian Nash equilibria are both zero. In the laboratory, we find that (i) the winners
are firms with zero initial cash balance, (ii) the qualities of the constructed buildings
are considerably less than 1 and decrease as periods proceed, (iii) winning prices are
considerably less than their proper costs and decrease as periods proceed, (iv) the proper
costs of firms with zero initial cash balance do not affect the winning prices but affect the
qualities of the constructed buildings, and (v) cost spendings relative to bids are higher
than the risk-neutral predictions.
The decreasing qualities of the constructed buildings and winning prices are consistent
with Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2002), who find that winning prices converge to the Nash
outcomes when they inform the subjects of which participant wins without uncertainty of
the cost. Our results, however, do not reach the Bayesian Nash outcome of zero in both
the qualities of the constructed buildings and winning prices. Upon examining the relation
between cost spendings and bids in Proposition 1, the risk attitudes of subjects is likely
to cause cost spending to diverge from theoretical level. Although more experiments are
needed to investigate why subjects spend and bid higher than the risk-neutral predictions,
we can conclude that firms with zero initial cash balance win and cut corner in considerable
scale.
This paper is a first step of analyzing corner-cutting. As we pointed out in the in-
troduction, auction authorities prescribe special rules to prevent corner-cutting, such as
setting minimum prices in order to exclude the abnormally low bids and stipulating the
necessary levels of initial cash balances for firms. Although our findings suggest that
firms cut corners in considerable scale if no such regulation exists, the effects of these
regulations are yet to be assessed. Thus, a next step is to evaluate those regulations. Our
goal is to design best regulation to maximize social benefits in models where firms cut
corners.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 1: First, we compute the maximizer c∗ of π on the two
subdomains, Subdomain 1: {c ≥ c} and Subdomain 2: {c ≤ c}.
Subdomain 1: On this subdomain, since b− c− r · (d− c) ≥ −w,
π(c) = c
d
· (b− c) + d− c
d
· {b− c− r · (d− c)}
= −r
d
· [c− 2r − 1
2r
· d]2 + b− d+ d
4r
At the singular point c1 = 2r−12r · d of this quadratic function, we have: π(c1) = b− d+ d4r .
Note
c1 R c⇔
2r − 1
2r
· d− ( r
r − 1 · d−
b+ w
r − 1 ) R 0⇔ b R
3r − 1
2r
· d− w.
Therefore, by letting b1 ≡ 3r−12r · d− w, we have:
argmax{π(c) : c ≥ c} =
½
c1 =
2r−1
2r
· d if b ≥ b1
c otherwise,
max{π(c) : c ≥ c} =
½
b− d+ d
4r
if b ≥ b1
− r
d
· [c− 2r−1
2r
· d]2 + b− d+ d
4r
otherwise.
Subdomain 2: On this subdomain, since b− c− r · (d− c) ≤ −w,
π(c) = c
d
· (b− c)− d− c
d
· w
= −1
d
∙
c− b+ w
2
¸2
+
1
4d
· £(b+ w)2 − 4dw¤ .
At the singular point c2 = b+w2 of this quadratic function, we have: π(c2) =
1
4d
·
[(b+ w)2 − 4dw]. Note
c2 R c⇔
b+ w
2
− ( r
r − 1 · d−
b+ w
r − 1 ) R 0⇔ b R
2r
r + 1
· d− w.
Therefore, by letting b2 ≡ 2rr+1 · d− w, we have:
argmax{π(c) : c ≤ c} =
½
c2 if b ≤ b2
c otherwise,
12
max{π(c) : c ≤ c} =
½
1
4d
· [(b+ w)2 − 4dw] if b ≤ b2
c
d
· (b− c)− d−c
d
· w otherwise.
Note:
b2 − b1 = (
2r
r + 1
· d− w)− (3r − 1
2r
· d− w) = (r − 1)
2
2r(r + 1)
· d.
Thus, by r > 1 and d > 0, b2 > b1. This implies that we have, Case A: b ≤ b1 < b2, Case
B: b1 < b < b2, or Case C: b1 < b2 ≤ b. In the following, we compute the maximizer of π
in each case.
Case A: Since c1 < c and c2 ≤ c holds, maxπ(c) = π(c2) = 14d · [(b+ w)2 − 4dw].
Case B: Since c2 < c < c1 holds, maxπ(c) = π(c1) = b − d + d4r or maxπ(c) =
π(c2) = 14d · [(b+ w)2 − 4dw].
We need to compute which of π(c1) or π(c2) is bigger. Note
π(c1)− π(c2) =
1
4
d−1 ·
µ
4bd− 2bw + 4dw − b2 − 4d2 − w2 + d
2
r
¶
.
Thus, by d > 0,
π(c1) R π(c2)⇔ 4bd− 2bw + 4dw − b2 − 4d2 − w2 +
d2
r
R 0.
Also note
4bd− 2bw + 4dw − b2 − 4d2 − w2 + d
2
r
= − (b− (2d− w))2 + d
2
r
.
The solutions of the equation − (b− (2d− w))2 + d2
r
= 0 are b = (2d− w)± d√
r
. Thus,
4bd− 2bw + 4dw − b2 − 4d2 − w2 + d
2
r
≥ 0⇔ 2d− w − d√
r
≤ b ≤ 2d− w + d√
r
.
Therefore, we have:
π(c1) ≥ π(c2)⇔ 2d− w −
d√
r
≤ b ≤ 2d− w + d√
r
.
Note that µ
2 · d− w + d√
r
¶
− b2 = d ·
µ
1√
r
− 2 r
r + 1
+ 2
¶
.
By d > 0,
2 · d− w + d√
r
≥ b2 ⇔
1√
r
− 2 r
r + 1
+ 2 ≥ 0.
By r > 1, 1√
r
− 2 r
r+1
+ 2 > 0, and so b2 < 2d− w + d√r holds. Also noteµ
2d− w − d√
r
¶
− b1 =
d
2r
· (√r − 1)2 > 0.
Thus, 2d− w − d√
r
≥ b1. Also note
b2 −
µ
2d− w − d√
r
¶
=
d
(r + 1)
√
r
· (r − 2√r + 1).
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By d > 0 and r > 1,
b2 ≥ 2d− w −
d√
r
⇔ r − 2
√
r + 1 ≥ 0.
By r > 1, d
dr
(r − 2
√
r + 1) = 1 − 1√
r
> 0. Thus, since, r − 2
√
r + 1 = 0 at r = 1,
b2 > 2d− w − d√r . Accordingly, we have:
b1 < 2d− w −
d√
r
< b2 < 2d− w +
d√
r
.
This implies that in Case B, we have:
π(c1) ≥ π(c2)⇔ 2d− w −
d√
r
≤ b.
Therefore,
maxπ(c) =
½
π(c2) = 14d · [(b+ w)2 − 4dw] if b ≤ 2d− w − d√r
π(c1) = b− d+ d4r otherwise.
Case C: Since c2 ≥ c and c1 > c holds, maxπ(c) = π(c∗) = b− d+ d4r .
QED
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Table 1. Market overviews 
Session 
Qualities of the 
produced goods 
Winning price Winner’s cost 
Ratio. (producers 
without initial 
cash balance win) 
No. of 
obs. 
1 0.37 (0.02)  16.20 (0.49)  10.45 (0.45)  0.94 80 
2 0.33 (0.02)  16.84 (0.47)  9.93 (0.52)  0.96 80 
total 0.35 (0.01)  16.52 (0.34)  10.19 (0.34)  0.95 160 
 
Table 2. Tobit regression of winners’ qualities on periods  
Session Intercept Period 
Adjusted 
R2 
No. of obs.
# Left- 
censored 
# Right- 
censored 
1 0.51*** (0.03)  –0.02*** (0.00) 0.22 80 0 0 
2 0.43*** (0.04)  –0.01*** (0.00) 0.09 80 0 0 
total 0.47*** (0.03)  –0.01*** (0.00) 0.15 160 0 0 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Adjusted R2 is the result of the OLS regression. *, **, and 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 3. Tobit regression of winning prices on periods 
Session Intercept Period 
Adjusted 
R2 
No. of obs.
# Left- 
censored 
# Right- 
censored 
1 20.77*** (0.84)  –0.46*** (0.09) 0.41 80 0 0 
2 20.77*** (0.84)  –0.46*** (0.09) 0.25 80 0 0 
total 21.06*** (0.57)  –0.53*** (0.06) 0.33 160 0 0 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Adjusted R2 is the result of the OLS regression. *, **, and 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 4. Effect of proper cost 
 Intercept Period 
Proper 
cost 
Adjusted R2 
No. of  
obs. 
# Left- 
censored 
# Right-
censored
Winning prices 
20.86*** 
(1.36)  
–0.53*** 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
0.33  160 0 0 
Qualities of the 
produced goods 
0.74*** 
(0.05) 
–0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.28  160 0 0 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Adjusted R2 is the result of the OLS regression. *, **, and 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. Relation between costs and bids if b b<  
Proper 
cost 
Intercept Price 
F-statistics    
(price=0.5, 
Intercept=0) 
Adjusted 
R2 
No. of 
obs. 
# Left- 
censored 
# Right- 
censored 
24 –0.78 (1.19)  0.62*** (0.07) 8.69***  0.49 78 0 0 
30 –1.61 (1.55)  0.72*** (0.08) 26.87***  0.51 80 0 1 
36 –0.74 (1.19)  0.71** (0.05) 54.62***  0.67 80 0 0 
42 –4.27*** (1.30) 0.87*** (0.06) 58.00***  0.72 80 0 0 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Adjusted R2 is the result of the OLS regression. *, **, and 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 6. Relation between costs and bids if b b≥  
Proper 
cost 
Intercept Price 
F-statistics     
(price=0, 
Intercept=3d/4)
Adjusted 
R2 
No. of 
obs. 
# Left- 
censored 
# Right-
censored
24 13.18***(1.84) 0.23***(0.07) 10.09***  0.08 82 0 10 
30 19.25***(2.51) 0.15*(0.07)  6.05***  0.01 80 0 8 
36 24.58***(3.57) 0.14*(0.09)  8.69***  0 80 0 11 
42 24.28***(5.93) 0.28**(0.13)  17.26***  0.04 80 0 19 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Adjusted R2 is the result of the OLS regression. *, **, and 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 1. Qualities of the produced goods 
 
Figure 2. Winning prices 
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